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Let me start by expressing my gratitude for these careful, generous and insightful readings of
my book. If all engagements with other people’s work lived up to the standards set by these
reviews, academic life would be a very different and far more productive experience.
One particularly gratifying aspect of these reviews is that they recognize the significance
of the notion of leverage. This concept has been central to my thinking as it has evolved over
the course of the books I have written so far, and before engaging the specific issues raised by
these reviews, it is useful here to restate, concisely and in plain terms, what work it was meant
to do.
It has always been very hard for social scientists to think about power in a purely
relational way – i.e., without assuming that it is ‘held’ by people or ‘exists’ in institutions. The
widespread influence of post-foundational theory (broadly understood to include various
strands of post-structuralism, post-modernism, constructivism and contemporary pragmatism)
has of course provided plenty of avenues for de-essentializing social-scientific concepts. But it
often seems that doing so, even when it is theoretically compelling and accompanied by a
critical ethos, undermines our ability to elaborate a perspective that is critical in the
substantive sense of being attuned to the material reality of inequality. That this is a real
problem has been apparent in the way Foucault’s understanding of power has been imported
into the social sciences: prevailing theorizations of disciplinary governance have been unable
to do justice to, let alone account for, the growing inequalities that have marked the neoliberal
era. Power, in such perspectives, loses its sting. To a large extent, that is why political
economy, even when it has been mindful of the epistemological implications of post-
foundational thinking, has retained a strong ‘meat-and-potatoes’ character, often layering a
theoretically naïve, idealist constructivism on top of a basic materialism.
So it often seems that we are forced to choose between a way of doing social science that
is theoretically sophisticated on the one hand and one that is critical, consequential and
realistic on the other. The notion of leverage tries to chart a course out of this impasse. It aims
to theorize power as working in a purely performative and relational way while still being able
to do justice to the reality of inequality and domination. Patterns of leverage emerge through
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that reflect the interests of others, and so develop identities and roles inflected by those
hegemonic interests. In Kantian terms, leverage refers to the way my conditions of possibility
double as your conditions of possibility, so that you, simply by pursuing the interests that you
have in virtue of the identity you have constructed and need to maintain, are advancing my
interests as well – while the same may not be true the other way round. The operation of
institutions should be seen through this lens: they do not enjoy substantial reality in and of
themselves, but, through their configuration, position some identities more centrally in the
fabric of human life than others, thereby amplifying and extending their influence.
I introduced the concept of leverage in my first book (2011) in the context of an
engagement with institutionalist problematics; I relied on it in my second book (2015a) to
think about how patterns of affective attachment work to produce more or less coherent
identities; and it plays a central role in Capital and Time, where I found it a particularly useful
way to think about power and control in a context of pervasive epistemic uncertainty. It is
possible to detect a shift in the way I use the concept over the course of this trajectory (which
only became clear to me when I started thinking more systematically about the role of this
concept in my work in response to the reviews here). In the earlier iterations of the concept,
even as I stressed the contingent, bricolage-like nature of the way in which social connections
are formed, I still placed considerable emphasis on the advantages that elite actors enjoy in
reading and manipulating the complexities of social life. Capital and Time, by contrast,
emphasizes the role that leverage plays in constructing patterns of power in situations of
pervasive uncertainty, where no actor enjoys privileged foresight and there is no way to
transcend the need to engage the future in a speculative way. When I am no more capable
than anyone else of making accurate predictions about the direction of social life, the best way
to optimize my chances of survival is to position myself as a critical hub of connections – so
that when risks to my security manifest, others will feel it to be in their own interest to support
my survival. If I can issue promises that circulate as the infrastructure of economic life, my
conditions of possibility will effectively double as others’ conditions of possibility. Banks have
learned this trick most effectively: they specialize in leveraging, issuing debt that circulates,
thereby ensuring that the public is invested in keeping them afloat (Sgambati, 2015).
This entails greater emphasis on the passive aspect of leverage. What matters is not
simply the way I position myself vis-à-vis others, but rather the way others become invested in
the reproduction of my identity. This logic of induced investment is one of the defining
characteristics of neoliberalism: the imperative it imposes is not simply to make smart
investments but to induce other people to invest in me and so to bid up the value of my capital
(Feher, 2009). The mechanism at work here becomes apparent when uncertainty is acute,
when the powerful can often sit back as the rest of us scramble to prop up the hegemonic
institutions in which we have become invested. The financial crisis of a decade ago provided
ample evidence of this logic: although the bailouts of large banks provoked an extraordinary
degree of anger, it was throughout evident that they were entirely necessary. In such moments,
power manifests its banal face, its non-representational character or even its sheer stupidity.
The way in which the banks weigh-in on the emerging future is unsophisticated, above all a
function of the threat they pose. Joseph Vogl (2014: 153) has usefully grasped this in terms of
the rise of a new form of sovereignty, which is bound up not with the possibility of transcending
the ordinary field of risk but with the possibility of “transforming [one’s] own risks into the
dangers of all others”.
This is where some of my interlocutors, in particular Jacqueline Best and Matthias
Thiemann, express some reservations about my claims. They are not convinced that my work
has distanced itself effectively from assumptions that elites ‘know what they are doing’ or that
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policymakers have an effective overview of the system at large. Instead, they discern a
residual teleology or functionalism in my approach that undermines my claim to have moved
towards a non-foundational theory. To be sure, I often feel that my entire intellectual trajectory
has been driven by an emerging awareness that elements of essentialism or foundationalism
lingered where I thought I had gone beyond them. So from that angle it would be incongruous
to deny the possibility that these critiques are onto something. Yet I remain unconvinced by the
specific arguments advanced by Best and Thiemann.
Over time, I have come to feel that The Development of American Finance (2011)
retained a certain Hegelianism when it comes to thinking about the role of the state – not in
the sense that it mistakes the appearances of the state for its substance (a problem most
prominently associated with the Weberian ‘bringing the state back in’ literature) but rather in
the sense that it was insufficiently specific about the mechanisms whereby challenges to more
direct, traditional forms of authority work to facilitate the growth of more distinctly modern,
infrastructural forms of state power.1 In particular, that book placed insufficient emphasis on
the specific role of failure, of gambles gone wrong. But in Capital and Time, failure is front and
centre. The book aims to theorize how patterns of power are built in a world without a known
destiny and where failure is both inevitable and unpredictable. So, when Thiemann (2018:
195) asks how “monetarism [can] have been a plan so well made and executed?” it is difficult
for me to recognize this as accurately reflecting the narrative I present. One of the book’s
central points is that monetarism was not the move of a mastermind – it was a gamble and
could have failed spectacularly. Volcker didn’t so much have a plan, but rather a sense that
something needed to give and that a major policy turn needed to be forced.
Best (2018) contextualizes the issue in a different way, taking up and challenging my take
on actor-network theory. She engages my claim that a useful contrast can be drawn between
early actor-network theory and the more recent work of its key exponents, which has re-
imported an idealism that hides behind a critique of economism. Best agrees there is
something to my critique of the evolution of actor-network theory but, noting that there is a
close affinity between my notion of leverage and the way early actor-network theory
understood the logic of enrolment and inscription, she argues that I could have done more to
explore the contributions of early actor-network theory. She views the latter as providing a
more rigorous framework for thinking about the material logistics of contingent, speculative
connections. Pursuing this argument, she highlights the contingencies and failures that beset
the processes through which monetarism was produced and evolved. Rejecting what she
perceives as the teleological overtones of my narrative, she argues that monetarism not only
had to pass through a long series of mediations to become a political force but also that it was
limited in duration and impact.
I agree that the literal implementation of monetarism was short-lived; indeed, I point out
that those in charge of monetary policy never thought of monetarism as a coherent doctrine,
and that it mostly provided a useful way to introduce policies that would otherwise have been
hard to justify and stick with. In the latter capacity, however, it played a key role in transitioning
the US political economy from one institutional context to another. Of course, wage repression
and changing fiscal policies played a key role in this respect; but the successful adoption of
such policies should be understood against the background of how the Volcker shock had
adjusted key institutional parameters and had so taken the ‘muddling through’ option off the
table. By presenting wage repression and fiscal austerity as policies that reversed (but did not
in key ways alter) the Keynesian logic of the post-war political economy, Best in my view
downplays the novelty of neoliberalism and in particular the distinctive way in which it has
continued to deploy financial logics (for instance, the way in which the management of price
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inflation has become intricately bound up with the management of asset inflation). The
monetarist turn was enormously consequential – not because it was a careful implementation
of a coherent theoretical design, but because it was a successful gamble that managed to fully
activate patterns of leverage that had been built up in previous years.
It is entirely true that monetarism never produced a world governed by the quantity theory
of money, and that instead it emerged and evolved through many material mediations, political
affiliations and ideological mutations. But it is only when we assess the practical relevance of
a doctrine by the degree to which it produced a world in its image that we need to see those
factors as compromising its reality or blunting its force. I would rather think of such
associations as the very mechanisms by which a notion acquires its force and engenders new
practical logics. This is in keeping with the insights of early-actor network theory, and it is there
– much more so than in the emphasis on contingency as such – that I believe its significance
resides.
At stake here is the status of contingency in historical explanation. Elsewhere (Konings,
2015c) I have discussed a key ambiguity in the constructivist approach to political economy:
while its ostensible purpose would seem to be in analyzing how reality emerges through chains
of associations and mediations, in practice it is often simply a stance on the professional
politics of knowledge, which cites the constructedness of things in support of its critique of
both neoliberal and marxisant claims for the solidity and cohesion of existing institutions. I
agree that a renewed engagement with early actor-network theory is a very promising way to
move past this worn-out rhetorical move, but it seems to me that this also requires a more
decisive break with the implicit belief that demonstrations of the constructed nature of the
present by themselves constitute evidence for its lack of coherence or the absence of
overarching logics.
Although Best’s approach is certainly much more sophisticated than a standard idealist
constructivism, she still relies on what I tend to think of as a counterfactual approach to the
role of historical contingency. From such a perspective, the importance of thinking historically
is that it allows us to counter claims regarding the naturalness or necessity of the present by
exposing the elements of contingency that went into its making. In a world where the near-
collapse of the financial system has become an occasion for a renewal of its centrality in
socio-economic life, I am not always sure that demonstrating the contingent character of
things by itself amounts to a meaningful form of critique. I am, of course, on board with the
critique of teleology if that means rejecting readings of history that assume it is driving towards
a specific end-goal. But it is increasingly difficult to find thoughtful people who would
subscribe to such a point of view. And the preoccupation with the dangers posed by
essentializing narratives has diverted significant amounts of mental energy from tracing the
vectors, rationalities, path-dependencies, and orientations that have given a determinate
direction to history.
So, while both Best and I appreciate the contributions of early actor-network theory, I
would still insist that the idealist turn taken by prominent actor-network theorists as they
moved into the study of finance is not accidental but reflective of a deeper conceptual
problem. The idealist turn is the flipside of a materialism that was always rather essentialist.
The latter fact, long effectively hidden under actor-network theory’s casual anti-Marxism, was
bound up with the under-theorization of what is involved in the emergence of an association
between two entities. As I emphasize in Capital and Time, any plausible account of how
elements combine with other elements needs to register that this involves a breaching of
immanence, a rupturing of material self-sufficiency. It is an insight central to the pragmatic
semiotics of Charles Peirce and the pragmatic sociology of George Herbert Mead, on which I
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rely in The Emotional Logic of Capitalism (2015a), that the world of meaning is triadic: the
creation of a new connection involves a reflexive moment of triangulation, in which the relation
between two elements is imagined from a third point that makes available a new perspective.
No association is purely contingent in the sense that it is arbitrary, simply the product of an
unforced play of difference; every relation involves an element of strategizing and introduces
elements of leverage and control. That is to say, all associations are investments.
I appreciate that it is hard to dissociate this strategic or reflexive element from notions of
‘thinking’ or ‘consciousness’. I myself am certainly not cognitively capable of producing an
image of the former without modelling it on the latter – after all, the moment when an entity
begins to relate to itself, as if it were not simply itself but more than itself, is irreducibly
paradoxical. Nevertheless, taking that cognitive limitation as a reason to proceed with
business-as-usual and to evade the paradox will only lead back to subject-object dichotomies
and endless attempts to bridge the divide through contrived theoretical innovations. That is
why Luhmann’s appreciation of the role of paradoxes is so important: rather than seeing them
as nonsensical propositions to be avoided or eliminated, he viewed them as the strange
formulations that emerge when we reach the outer limits of the frameworks we are working
within. As such, he took them as vital clues to the logic on which a system or institution
operates and the constitutive blind spots on which it is constructed. Paradoxes tell us
something about the unavoidable element of self-referentiality that is embedded in the
operation of any systemic logic and as such they are privileged points of entry when it comes
to understanding how determinate entities are possible in a world that lacks foundations and
where every move is a speculative one.
Luhmann plays a central role in scaffolding the argument of Capital and Time because he
provides a more compelling understanding of how associations come into being and operate
than actor-network theory does. In particular, I argue that the paradoxical self-referentiality of
money provides an extremely useful set of clues to the speculative operations at the heart of
capital. This involves an unusual appropriation of Luhmann that departs from the established
interpretation, which tends to focus on his understanding of society in terms of the interaction
of differentiated subsystems. Leon Wansleben (2018) questions the usefulness of this move,
arguing that the more traditional Luhmannian scheme is quite consistent with some of my
claims. Wansleben’s grasp of the intricacies of Luhmann’s work clearly exceeds my own, and it
may very well be the case that I have failed to appreciate some of the possible uses offered by
the received interpretation of Luhmann’s work. But I am not sure that it negates the
importance of reconstructing a version of Luhmann that is more radical and critical than the
one we have been given so far. For instance, the way Wansleben translates my argument into a
different Luhmannian language is accurate enough, but I have the sense that more traditional
Luhmannian scholars would have the same kinds of issues with it as Wansleben does with my
version. It seems to me that the core rationale for Luhmann’s claim to be offering a radical
constructivism has to consist not in the fact that society consists of subsystems that cannot
communicate with each other, but in the fact that any system is self-referential and therefore
cannot generate a totalizing point of view from which it can diagnose its blind spots and
assess itself in objective, neutral terms. There is an important shift in emphasis here: whereas
the former keeps us close to conventional problematics, the latter can serve as a new resource
of critique. If we picture society in terms of the interaction of self-referential subsystems, the
most we can hope for is a problematic of ‘relative autonomy’, exactly the kind of critical
paradigm that gets irresolvably stuck in dichotomies of the material and the ideal.2
The counterfactual logic of constructivist historical reasoning becomes more apparent in
the reservations expressed by Thiemann, which revolve around the concern that I do not give
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sufficient weight to the plans and intentions of key actors. He highlights in particular the plans
for more coherent system-level regulation that circulated among policymakers in the aftermath
of the crisis. These include “new capital surcharges for global systemic financial institutions,
but also requirements to create ‘living wills’, as well as decisions to increase the loss-
absorbing capacity of large banks” (Thiemann, 2018: 195). According to him, such initiatives
should be taken more seriously than they are in Capital and Time:
One can characterize [them] as an ordoliberal pipedream of recreating a direct match between profits and
entrepreneurial responsibility, or of reinstating market discipline and of thereby ending ‘too big to fail’, but
one cannot simply ignore [them]. (Thiemann, 2018: 195-96).
But the book doesn’t ignore them – far from it. I argue that these attempts to manage system
risk with new instruments should be seen as an evolution of distinctly neoliberal practices and
modes of governance. They are certainly not pipedreams; instead, they are conceptual devices
embedded in neoliberal practice. I do appreciate that, in reframing the significance of these
innovations in this way, I am giving short shrift to the good intentions held by some people who
could not (or did not want to) see that these new instruments were going to facilitate the
resurrection rather than suppression of capital. But perhaps we don’t always need to care
about people’s ideas in the specific way that they would like us to.
At work in Thiemann’s objection, I believe, is a tendency to conflate agency and
consciousness. Although Thiemann summarizes my critique of rational constructivism with
great insight and a number of formulations that I wish I had come up with myself, it is difficult
to escape the conclusion that it is precisely that paradigm that he is reluctant to let go of
entirely. When he writes that “repeated reference to Luhmann seems to suggest a doing-away
with agency – after all, Luhmann was clearly opposed to any theory of agency” (Thiemann,
2018: 196), he stays close to the common interpretation of Luhmann’s work which mistakes
his rejection of transcendental theories of agency for a rejection of agency altogether. If we
read Luhmann against the grain, I do not think it is possible to see him as evacuating agency.
Luhmann was certainly opposed to voluntarist theories of agency that oppose it to the
structuring effects of systems. But what he provided instead was a radical, non-essentialist
theory of agency. For him, the emergence of agency and the process of system formation are
closely related, indeed essentially identical processes: agency is what Daniel Dennett (1984)
referred to as the “elbowroom” that emerges with the evolutionary logic of system formation.
Such elbowroom, however significant, never flips over into an ability to comprehend the
social field in its totality or to manipulate it through clean, externally originated interventions. It
is only ever leverage, an enhanced ability to both provoke and benefit from volatility in the
social field. Leverage is at its core speculative – it exists awkwardly between on the one hand
the impossibility of self-contained material subsistence and on the other hand the impossibility
of reflexivity ever escaping the material conditions from which it emerged. Of course, the
pragmatic logic of triangulation through which we construct new associations and investments
can at times appear to be highly strategic, driven by complex calculations and sophisticated
assessments of risk. But such appearances of precision are undone when volatility threatens
to tip over into full-blown crisis and patterns of power operate in a much blunter, blackmail-like
manner.
Leverage is the modality whereby determinate patterns of power and control are
constructed in a world without foundations. As such, it has a privileged relationship to
modernity. The distinctive characteristic of modern life is the (often implicit but all-too-real)
awareness that that there exist no outside criteria, no known destiny, no external measures
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against which we can judge the value of our investments. As Leigh Claire La Berge (2018: 201)
puts it in her discussion, “To be a creature of modernity, one is forced to leverage what one
has. One can’t recuse oneself from leveraging. One cannot get outside of a leveraged world”.
Neoliberalism as a rationality of governance has intuited and exploited this very effectively, in
ways that its progressively minded critics have generally been unable to recognize. In Capital
and Time I work this out in terms of Hayek’s critique of rational constructivism and its
relationship to systems theory, but that is obviously not to suggest that neoliberalism started
off as a specific philosophical innovation that was then propelled into real-world action.
Instead, this theme is one point of entry (among others) that allows us to grasp the operation
of neoliberalism as a practical rationality, which works in diffuse, contingent and indirect ways.
In other words, the strength of neoliberalism has always resided not in the production of a
theoretical master plan, but in the ability to do something productive with the awareness that
the successful execution of a master plan is inherently impossible. Characterized by a
tremendous degree of comfort with the speculative dimension, it has developed the logic of
leverage into an economy of provocation and blackmail.
I appreciate that these considerations by themselves will not convince anyone who is
invested in seeing economism, structuralism, functionalism and teleology as the primary
dangers. To advance a critique that emphasizes the constitutive role of the perceptual blind
spot while still expecting that critique to find traction without delay would be very naïve. This is
why the book does not explore in great detail the nuances of field-specific debates – someone
who is not willing to give my argument a run for its money is unlikely to be convinced by such
specifics. It has its sights set farther afield: selectively taking up key themes in political
economy and social theory, it goes as far as it can in showing what becomes visible by
adopting the particular angle it proposes. Pinning its hopes of rhetorical traction in a crowded
field on the demonstration of analytical payoff, it banks on the experiential ‘a-ha’ moment of
new insight.
Thiemann’s take on the critical project of Capital and Time is therefore entirely accurate
and worth repeating. As he puts it, the book
follows in [its] critical endeavor the epistemological and ontological commitment expressed in [its] analysis
of capitalism, in which any (theoretical) investment is an act of speculation, which gains validity by
inscribing itself into a larger network of (analytical) promises. Given the impossibility of discerning externally
valid criteria for critique, [it] is making a speculative investment with [its] own proposal, hoping that others
find it useful for their own speculative venturing in the theoretical terrain. (Thiemann, 2018: 197)
Thiemann is not without appreciation for the content of the project, but he nonetheless seems
to feel that this style of critical analysis is inherently somewhat nihilistic, the result of having
imbibed too much of the neoliberal post-truth Kool-Aid. I accept that my project, by denying the
viability of many of the political strategies on which we tend to pin our hopes for the future,
may engender a certain bleakness. Perhaps I am just more capable than others of living in a
desert of negative critique, devoid of hope for better futures – but I highly doubt it. Personally I
find nothing more soul-destroying and life-negating than the false optimism that continuously
leads us to look to policymakers and politicians for interests and capacities that they patently
do not possess, only to subsequently and predictably engage in the ritual lamentation of
missed opportunities and the ‘failure to learn lessons’. What gets suppressed in the process is
a kind of conceptual curiosity that I think is far more politically valuable than it is typically
given credit for.
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Although I am convinced such curiosity needs to start with an engagement of the
negative, I do not think there is any necessary reason that it needs to remain stuck in negative
critique. The encounter with the negative is a constructive moment, where new things can
happen. La Berge questions what she perceives as my overly austere understanding of the
possibilities of critique suggested in the passage that she cites at the start of her review. And
she argues that a more in-depth engagement with work that has brought the resources of
literary critique to bear on questions of money and finance would be extremely helpful in
developing the positive characteristics of a post-foundational critique of contemporary
capitalism. I agree with this point. The argument that critique never escapes the performative
condition – in the specific sense that it never becomes a matter of holding reality up against a
set of external norms – has its specific relevance in the context of the intersection of political
economy and social theory that is targeted by the book’s argument. But I recognize that much
could be gained from breaking out of the specific interdisciplinary universe that Capital and
Time inhabits and engaging more thoroughly with humanities scholarship, literary critique, as
well as the worlds of art and activism.
Although I have few doubts about the value of such a project, I do not consider myself
remotely qualified to undertake it. Or perhaps I just am just acutely aware of how much
remains to be done when it comes to conceptualizing the core categories of political economy.
That is probably one of the reasons why, whereas my previous book ‘opened out’ financial
issues onto various other traditions of knowledge, Capital and Time works more by ‘drawing in’
select resources from social theory to reconstruct our understanding of money, finance and
capital and how they are governed – which are classic questions of political economy. In this
way it has sought to push back against the scientism (which typically goes by the name of
‘disciplinary rigor’) that is so rampant not just in economics but equally in political science and
sociology, and which serves as a major obstacle to making the insights of post-foundational
theory fully relevant to our understanding of money, the most emphatically symbolic
institutions that we have.
Notes
1. See my review of Knafo’s (2013) book for further reflections on this (Konings, 2015b).
2. For instance, see Jessop’s (1990) incorporation of autopoiesis into state theory.
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